Approximately stable, school optimal, and student-truthful many-to-one matchings (via differential privacy)

Sampath Kannan, Jamie Morgenstern, Aaron Roth, Zhiwei Steven Wu

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

10 Scopus citations

Abstract

We present a mechanism for computing asymptotically stable school optimal matchings, while guaranteeing that it is an asymptotic dominant strategy for every student to report their true preferences to the mechanism. Our main tool in this endeavor is differential privacy: we give an algorithm that coordinates a stable matching using differentially private signals which lead to our truthfulness guarantee. This is the first setting in which it is known how to achieve nontrivial truthfulness guarantees for students when computing school optimal matchings, assuming worst-case preferences (for schools and students) in large markets.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 26th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA 2015
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery
Pages1890-1903
Number of pages14
EditionJanuary
ISBN (Electronic)9781611973747
DOIs
StatePublished - 2015
Externally publishedYes
Event26th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA 2015 - San Diego, United States
Duration: Jan 4 2015Jan 6 2015

Publication series

NameProceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
NumberJanuary
Volume2015-January

Other

Other26th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA 2015
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CitySan Diego
Period1/4/151/6/15

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
Copyright © 2015 by the Society for Industrial and Applied Mathmatics.

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