Can tournaments induce rational play in the centipede game? Exploring dominance vs. strategic uncertainty

Christopher R. Mcintosh; Jason F. Shogren; Andrew J. Moravec

Can tournaments induce rational play in the centipede game? Exploring dominance vs. strategic uncertainty

Christopher R. Mcintosh, Jason F. Shogren, Andrew J. Moravec

Economics (Duluth)

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

We compare behavior in a one-shot Centipede game across several payoff structures including nonlinear payoff tournaments. Assuming Nash to be optimal, results suggest nonlinear tournament payoffs based on overall relative rewards are not sufficient to increase Nash results in the one-shot Centipede style setting. Evidence suggests that reducing strategic uncertainty is more important than increasing dominance in promoting Nash play.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	2018-2024
Number of pages	7
Journal	Economics Bulletin
Volume	29
Issue number	3
State	Published - 2009

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Can tournaments induce rational play in the centipede game? Exploring dominance vs. strategic uncertainty

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