Abstract
To investigate the external validity of Ultimatum and Dictator game behavior we conduct experiments in field settings with naturally occurring variation in "social framing." Our participants are students at Middlebury College, non-traditional students at Kansas City Kansas Community College (KCKCC), and employees at a Kansas City distribution center. Ultimatum game offers are ordered: KCKCC > employee > Middlebury. In the Dictator game employees are more generous than students in either location. Workers behaved distinctly from both student groups in that their allocations do not decrease between games, an effect we attribute to the social framing of the workplace.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Field Experiments in Economics |
| Editors | G.W. Harrison, Jeffrey Carpenter, John List |
| Pages | 261-289 |
| Number of pages | 29 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 2004 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Publication series
| Name | Research in Experimental Economics |
|---|---|
| Volume | 10 |
| ISSN (Print) | 0193-2306 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:We thank Julia Assael, Gary Carpenter, Pamela Carpenter, and Marla Weinstein for research assistance, Laura Burks for help with the data, Mary Grunke and Cathy Plaster for facilitating our experiments at KCKCC, three referees for their thoughtful comments, and the MacArthur Foundation’s norms and preferences working group for generous financial support. In addition Carpenter acknowledges the National Science Foundation (SES-CAREER 0092953) and Verhoogen acknowledges the MacArthur Foundation’s cost of inequality network.