IMUX: Managing tor connections from two to infinity, and beyond

John Geddes; Rob Jansen; Nicholas Hopper

doi:10.1145/2665943.2665948

IMUX: Managing tor connections from two to infinity, and beyond

John Geddes, Rob Jansen, Nicholas Hopper

Computer Science and Engineering

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

13 Scopus citations

Abstract

We consider proposals to improve the performance of the Tor overlay network by increasing the number of connections between relays, such as Torchestra and PCTCP. We introduce a new class of attacks that can apply to these designs, socket exhaustion, and show that these attacks are effective against PCTCP. We also describe IMUX, a design that generalizes the principles behind these designs while still mitigating against socket exhaustion attacks. We demonstrate empirically that IMUX resists socket exhaustion while finding that web clients can realize up to 25% increase in performance compared to Torchestra. Finally, we empirically evaluate the interaction between these designs and the recently proposed KIST design, which aims to improve performance by intelligently scheduling kernel socket writes.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Publisher	Association for Computing Machinery
Pages	181-190
Number of pages	10
ISBN (Electronic)	9781450331487
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1145/2665943.2665948
State	Published - Nov 3 2014
Event	13th Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society, WPES 2014, in Conjunction with the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, ACM CCS 2014 - Scottsdale, United States Duration: Nov 3 2014 → …

Publication series

Name	Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
ISSN (Print)	1543-7221

Other

Other	13th Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society, WPES 2014, in Conjunction with the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, ACM CCS 2014
Country/Territory	United States
City	Scottsdale
Period	11/3/14 → …

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
Copyright © 2014 ACM.

Keywords

Anonymity
Attack
Performance
Privacy
Socket exhaustion
Tor

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10.1145/2665943.2665948

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IMUX: Managing tor connections from two to infinity, and beyond. / Geddes, John; Jansen, Rob; Hopper, Nicholas.
Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security. Association for Computing Machinery, 2014. p. 181-190 (Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Geddes, J, Jansen, R & Hopper, N 2014, IMUX: Managing tor connections from two to infinity, and beyond. in Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security. Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Association for Computing Machinery, pp. 181-190, 13th Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society, WPES 2014, in Conjunction with the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, ACM CCS 2014, Scottsdale, United States, 11/3/14. https://doi.org/10.1145/2665943.2665948

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IMUX: Managing tor connections from two to infinity, and beyond

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Keywords

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