TY - JOUR
T1 - Long-term care standards
T2 - enforcement and compliance
AU - Christianson, J. B.
PY - 1979
Y1 - 1979
N2 - This paper discusses the regulation of long-term care in the United States. First, it addresses alternate models of regulation that potentially could explain both enforcer and provider actions. Then it describes in more detail the incentives for enforcement of regulatory standards. Empirical evidence concerning the effect of regulation on provider incomes and the reltionship between reported compliance with standards and provider operating costs is examined. In the latter case, the evidence is consistent with a self-interest theory of behavior for regulatory agencies and inspectors. Ideas for reform of the long-term care marketplace are summarized in the concluding section, with emphasis on their probable impact on enforcement of standards.
AB - This paper discusses the regulation of long-term care in the United States. First, it addresses alternate models of regulation that potentially could explain both enforcer and provider actions. Then it describes in more detail the incentives for enforcement of regulatory standards. Empirical evidence concerning the effect of regulation on provider incomes and the reltionship between reported compliance with standards and provider operating costs is examined. In the latter case, the evidence is consistent with a self-interest theory of behavior for regulatory agencies and inspectors. Ideas for reform of the long-term care marketplace are summarized in the concluding section, with emphasis on their probable impact on enforcement of standards.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0018611285&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0018611285&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1215/03616878-4-3-414
DO - 10.1215/03616878-4-3-414
M3 - Article
C2 - 118205
AN - SCOPUS:0018611285
SN - 0361-6878
VL - 4
SP - 414
EP - 434
JO - Journal of health politics, policy and law
JF - Journal of health politics, policy and law
IS - 3
ER -