Abstract
We examine how the market power of physician groups affects the form of their contracts with health insurers. We develop a simple model of physician contracting based on 'behavioral economics' and test it with data from two sources: a survey of physician group practices in Minnesota; and the physician component of the Community Tracking Survey. In both data sets we find that increases in groups' market power are associated with proportionately more fee-for-service revenue and less revenue from capitation.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 115-132 |
Number of pages | 18 |
Journal | International journal of health care finance and economics |
Volume | 11 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jun 2011 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:This work was supported by the Agency for Health Care Quality Research.
Keywords
- Contracts
- Market power
- Physicians