Abstract
Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one formal logic that correctly (or best, or legitimately) codifies the logical consequence relation in natural language. This essay provides a taxonomy of different variations on the logical pluralist theme based on a fivepart structure, and then identifies an unoccupied position in this taxonomy: perspectival logical pluralism. Perspectival pluralism provides an attractive position from which to formulate a philosophy of logic from a feminist perspective (and from other, identity-based perspectives, such as critical race theory). An example of how such an account might be developed is sketched. The essay concludes by defusing an obvious objection to the perspectival approach: the claim that the correct logic (or logics), in virtue of the formal nature of logic, should be independent of considerations regarding the identity of the reasoner.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 171-202 |
| Number of pages | 32 |
| Journal | Res Philosophica |
| Volume | 100 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Apr 2023 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2023 Roy T. Cook.
